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Click It or Ticket, But Don’t Admit
It? How Unrestrained Drivers and
Passengers Take Us for a Ride
E. R. Wright*
While the COVID-19 crisis has forced societies and governments to
confront new challenges and answer new questions, it has also renewed
and reignited longstanding debates about the extent of individuals’
obligations to each other.1 In particular, the American body politic is
once again embroiled in conflict over the reach of an individual’s
personal choices and the extent to which consideration of the potentially
harmful effects of our choices on others should shape individual
behaviors.2 Today, this fight centers on public health measures
intended to reduce the spread and severity of COVID-19, such as
masking, distancing, and vaccination.3 Debates rage over where the
freedom of individual choice—a nearly-sacred tenant of the gospel of
American exceptionalism—intersects with and must yield to the
interests of others. Governments at all levels have largely responded to
the current crisis with ad hoc improvisation and strained efforts to
balance public health imperatives against real and imagined threats to
individual liberty.
These clumsy attempts include carving out a creative range of
exemptions to masking, testing, and vaccine requirements, as well as
draping businesses with blanket immunity shields that protect against
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1. See Susan Page & Nada Hassanein, No Vaccination? Americans Back Tough
Rules and Mask Mandates to Protect the Common Good, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/08/22/americans-back-mask-covidvaccine-mandate-protect-common-good/8134392002/.
2. Page, supra note 1.
3. Id.
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liability even for grossly negligent conduct.4 Each of these measures has
met ferocious opposition from one camp or another, and elected and
aspiring public officials have weaponized the COVID-19 crisis to the
point that outbreaks of fights at local school board meetings regularly
make national news.5
While the pandemic created too many unprecedented challenges, the
debate over the line between public safety and personal choice is
anything but new.6 A few decades ago, that debate manifested around
state laws mandating seatbelt use by drivers and occupants of motor
vehicles.7 Then, as now, states facing an epidemic of traffic injuries and
fatalities struggled to persuade a reluctant population to take the basic
measure of buckling up.8 Then, as now, the messy politics of legislating
public safety resulted in the imposition of mandates coupled with broad
liability shields.9
It remains far too early to understand or appreciate the long-term
impacts of the current iteration of legislative attempts to protect the
public in the face of vocal opposition. However, states can learn from
the seatbelt debate that trading blanket immunity for safety mandates
can create problems that vex the judicial branch even long after societal
and technological changes have minimized the utility of such liability
shields.
This Article examines one example of the immunity grants that
legislative bodies too often bake into laws passed to address public
safety emergencies: prohibition of the seatbelt defense. The Article
begins by explaining the theory behind the defense and tracing the
history of the passage of seatbelt mandate laws that incorporate
prohibition of the defense.10 It then illustrates scenarios in which

4. Chris Marr, Covid-19 Shield Laws Proliferate Even as Liability Suits Do Not,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Jun. 8, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/covid19-shield-laws-proliferate-even-as-liability-suits-do-not.
5. Ivana Saric, The Fight Over Mask Mandates in Schools Turns Violent, AXIOS
(Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.axios.com/mask-school-mandate-violence-covid-3abff916242d-4db5-87f7-b4314dc57c3d.html.
6. Philip Bump, When the Battle Over American Freedom Was Centered on Seat Belt
POST
(Sept.
16,
2021),
Laws,
WASHINGTON
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/09/16/when-battle-over-american-freedomwas-centered-seat-belt-laws/.
7. Bump, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. See infra Section II.
10. This Article does not examine judicially created limitations on seatbelt nonuse
evidence, which typically centered on absence of any common law duty to wear a seatbelt.
For an overview of court decisions limiting the seatbelt defense, see Steven B. Hantler et
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banning the defense creates breakdowns of fundamental tort principles
and undermines justice. Next, the Article discusses the original
justifications offered by opponents of the seatbelt defense and
highlights the ways behavioral and technological changes have
rendered those justifications empty. Finally, the Article argues that
piecemeal, limited exemptions to bans on the seatbelt defense are
ineffective and therefore, the Article advocates for full reinstatement of
the seatbelt defense.
I. THE SEATBELT DEFENSE: A LEGAL THEORY DEEPLY ROOTED IN TORT
PRINCIPLES
Simply, the seatbelt defense is the use of a vehicle occupant’s failure
to wear a seatbelt as a defense in a tort action.11 The defense takes
multiple forms, each presenting a straightforward application of the
basic principles of fairness underlying tort law. This Section examines
several applications of the seatbelt defense. While it does not purport to
offer an exhaustive review of potential applications for the defense, this
Section illustrates the most common—and most commonsense—
applications for the seatbelt defense in modern tort law.
A. Contributory and Comparative Negligence
It is not difficult to imagine how often a collision plaintiff’s failure to
wear a seatbelt could amount to contributory negligence, particularly in
a simple two-car, two-person collision case. If a defendant presents
evidence that the plaintiff acted negligently by failing to buckle up, and
that negligence was a cause that contributed to the plaintiff’s damages,
our most basic understanding of tort law as a vehicle to compensate the
innocent plaintiff demands at least a reduction in the plaintiff’s
award.12

al., Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO. J. LAW & PUB. POLICY 21, 32–36
(2005).
11. See Hansen v. Howard O. Miller, Inc., 460 P.2d 739, 742–43 (Idaho 1969); see also
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., New Seat Belt Defense Issues: The Impact of Air Bags and
Mandatory Seat Belt Use Statutes on the Seat Belt Defense, and the Basis of Damage
Reduction Under the Seatbelt Defense, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1371 (1989) (noting that the
“seat belt defense in an automobile personal injury case reduces the damages for which
the defendant is responsible, because the plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt caused a
portion of plaintiff’s damages.”).
12. Bentzler v. Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640–41 (Wis. 1967) (“a matter of common
knowledge, an occupant of an automobile either knows or should know of the additional
safety factor produced by the use of seat belts,” and therefore is “in those cases where seat
belts are available and there is evidence before the jury indicating a causal relationship
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American tort law first recognized the concept of contributory
negligence in 1824, when Massachusetts adopted the defense because a
plaintiff should not recover “unless . . . he used ordinary care; for
without that, it is by no means certain that he himself was not the
cause of his own injury.”13 American jurisdictions quickly followed
Massachusetts’ lead and adopted contributory negligence, relying on
Lord Ellenborough’s famous declaration that, “[a] party is not to cast
himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault of
another, and avail[s] himself of it, if he do[es] not himself use common
and ordinary caution to be in the right.”14 Modern shifts toward more
forgiving standards of comparative negligence and apportioned fault
still rely on the principle that the “idea of fairness . . . calls on tort law
to take account of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence in ascertaining
the liability of a negligent defendant[.]”15 These basic tenets of tort law
require juries to consider whether a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seatbelt
breached the duty to exercise ordinary care and whether such breach
caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.
1. Failure to Wear a Seatbelt is Negligent Conduct
Negligence law is rooted in objective reasoning, and whether certain
conduct is negligent depends on jurors’ conceptions of the general
“reasonable person.”16 In general, however, modern tort law applies a
loose formula to determine whether a party exercised reasonable care.17
Learned Hand’s famous formula holds that the duty of reasonable care
depends upon the relationship between the likelihood of harm, the
gravity of potential harm, and the burden of taking steps to prevent or
mitigate the harm.18 Where the likelihood or gravity of potential harm
between the injuries sustained and the failure to use seat belts, it is proper and necessary
to instruct the jury in that regard.”).
13. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 623 (1824).
14. Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill 200, 205 (Md. 1847) (quoting Butterfield v. Forrester, 103
Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B. 1809)). For an overview of American adoption of the doctrine of
contributory negligence, see Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory
Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 839–41 (1946).
15. Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87
YALE L.J. 697, 725 (1978) (noting that “the fairness idea is entirely satisfied by a liabilitydividing rule . . . .”).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“[t]he
standard [of conduct] which the community demands must be an objective and external
one, rather than that of the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular
individual.”).
17. UDR Texas Props., L.P. v. Petrie, 517 S.W.3d 98, 106–07 (Tex. 2017) (Willett, J.,
concurring).
18. United States v. Caroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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increases, the duty to take preventive or mitigative measures increases
proportionally, especially if the burden of taking such measures is low.19
Conversely, where the burden to prevent harm is high, tort law
tolerates a higher likelihood and greater gravity of potential harm.20
Applying these general principles to collision cases, failure to wear a
seatbelt unquestioningly amounts to negligent conduct.21 Refusing to
wear a belt dramatically increases the likelihood and gravity of
potential injuries, and the burden of belting is negligible.22 Accordingly,
where a plaintiff’s injuries were actually or proximately caused by their
own failure to take reasonable care by buckling up, the seatbelt defense
should apply to prevent a plaintiff from profiting from their own
negligence.
a. Failure to Buckle Up Increases Potential for and
Degree of Injury
The life-saving benefits of wearing a seatbelt are commonly known.23
Unrestrained vehicle occupants are both more likely than belted
occupants to suffer injuries in a collision and more likely to suffer more
severe injuries than their belted counterparts.24 Unbelted occupants are
more likely than their belted counterparts to suffer injuries
disproportionate to the force of impact.25 A light tap on the rear end of a
vehicle can send an unrestrained driver or front-seat passenger into the
steering wheel or through the windshield, causing injuries—or more
severe injuries—where a restrained driver would suffer no or only mild
injuries.26 Moreover, an unrestrained occupant’s body is subject to the
full brunt of forces of movement a collision creates, increasing the
likeliness and severity of spine and soft tissue injuries.27 In general, a
vehicle occupant who wears a seatbelt is 45% less likely to suffer fatal

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Cullen v. Timm, 184 Ga. App. 80, 83, 360 S.E.2d 745, 749 (1987) (affirming
jury award of equal amounts to plaintiffs with disproportionate injuries because the
failure of one plaintiff to wear seatbelt while other plaintiff was restrained authorized
jury “to take into consideration such issues as ordinary care, comparative negligence, and
assumption of the risk with special reference to” the unrestrained plaintiff, “and to reduce
accordingly what might conceivably been a larger award of general damages.”).
22. Bentzler, 149 N.W.2d at 639–40.
23. Id. at 640.
24. Traffic
Safety
Facts:
Occupant
Protection,
NHTSA
(Jun.
2020),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812967.
25. Id. at *8.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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injuries and 50% less likely to suffer severe injuries in a collision than
an unrestrained occupant.28
Plainly, refusing to wear an available safety belt increases the
likelihood that the plaintiff will suffer harm as well as the degree of
harm the plaintiff is likely to suffer. Because the burden of wearing a
safety belt is negligible, especially weighed against the increased risk
and gravity of harm, failing to wear an available seatbelt is negligent
conduct.
b. Burden of Belting is Negligible
Especially compared to the degree of risk buckling up prevents, the
burden of wearing a seatbelt is negligible. Since 1968, all new motor
vehicles manufactured and sold in the United States have been
required to incorporate seatbelts.29 As a result, nearly all passenger
cars and trucks on American roads are equipped with seatbelts.
Buckling up therefore imposes no additional cost on drivers or
purchasers of passenger vehicles.
Additionally, since safety belts were introduced in vehicles, seatbelt
comfort has improved steadily. Product designers now take account of
differences in body shapes and sizes, and most safety belt systems
feature multi-point adjustability to make buckling up more comfortable
than ever. Even while seatbelts have become more comfortable,
accessories advertised to make vehicle occupants even more comfortable
are widely available. Simply, buckling up does not create discomfort
sufficient to meaningfully burden a vehicle occupant.
While belted occupants sometimes suffer injuries such as seatbelt
rash or bruising, the frequency and severity of injuries caused by
seatbelts have decreased as seatbelt systems—along with other vehicle
safety features—have incorporated new technologies. The potential for
seatbelt injury imposes the greatest arguable burden on drivers and
passengers, but that burden shrinks in proportion to the protection that
seatbelts provide.30 Wearing a seatbelt reduces a vehicle occupant’s
chances of suffering serious injury by 50%.31 The risk of seatbelt injury
also fails to meaningfully burden a vehicle occupant.

28. Id. at *6.
29. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard Act, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2021); see
Michelle R. Mangrum, The Seat Belt Defense: Must the Reasonable Man Wear a Seat Belt,
50 MO. L. REV. 968, 979–80 (1985).
30. Mangrum, supra note 29, at 968.
31. Traffic Safety Facts: Seat Belt Use in 2010—Overall Results, NHTSA (Sept. 2010)
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811378.pdf.
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Because seatbelt use dramatically decreases both the likelihood and
severity of potential collision-related injuries, and wearing a seatbelt
imposes no meaningful burden on vehicle occupants, failure to buckle
up fits squarely into tort law’s most basic understanding of negligent
conduct.
2. Negligent Failure to Belt Can Cause Damages
Failure to wear a belt can actually and proximately cause huge
damages.32 Where an unrestrained vehicle occupant suffers injuries
they would not have sustained if they wore a seatbelt, the failure to belt
is the actual cause of the occupant’s injuries.33 Moreover, if the failure
to buckle up causes more severe injuries to the unrestrained occupant
than the same collision would yield a belted occupant, the occupant’s
failure to wear the seatbelt is a superseding intervening cause that
should at least factor into any calculation of damages or apportionment
of fault.34
B. Product Liability Defense
Another straightforward application for the seatbelt defense arises in
product liability cases centered on challenges to a vehicle’s
crashworthiness. For example, an unrestrained plaintiff who brings a
products liability claim against an auto manufacturer should be subject
to the defense that he misused the product. If a plaintiff had actual or
constructive knowledge of a product’s safety features but failed to use
them and therefore suffered an injury, the defendant is entitled to the
defense that the plaintiff’s misuse undermines a claim that the product
was defectively designed.35
In the automobile context, design defect cases typically hinge on a
vehicle’s crashworthiness—that is, how well a vehicle protects its
occupants during common collision scenarios.36 Crashworthiness cases
have produced many of the “nuclear verdicts” that cause outrage and
outcry from industry groups and defense bars.37 Plaintiffs and their

32. See Cochran, supra note 11, at 1374–75.
33. Id.
34. See Leonard Charles Schwartz, The Seat Belt Defense and Mandatory Seat Belt
Usage: Law, Ethics, and Economics, 284 IDAHO L. REV. 275, 284–85 (1988).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, Products Liability, § 15 cmt. b (AM. L. INST.
1998).
36. Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 782–83 (W. Va. 1992).
37. See, e.g., Nuclear Verdict Fact Sheet, INSURANCE COUNCIL OF TEXAS,
https://www.insurancecouncil.org/userfiles/uploads/Nuclear_verdicts_fact_sheetr.pdf (last
visited Jan. 27, 2022).
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counsel argue that such verdicts are necessary to serve the deterrent
purpose of tort law,38 which seeks to compel behavior that benefits the
public.39 Automobile manufacturers are too rich (and well-insured) to be
affected by damages awards that fairly compensate plaintiffs even in
catastrophic cases. Accordingly, eye-popping punitive damages awards
are necessary to compel manufacturers to design and produce safer
vehicles.
While that argument is persuasive, manufacturers have an equally
strong argument that plaintiffs in crashworthiness cases should be
subject to the seatbelt defense.40 Today’s vehicles no longer treat safety
as an afterthought; automakers no longer retrofit vehicles designed for
speed or performance with rudimentary safety belts. Rather, modern
cars and trucks are equipped with holistic, integrated safety systems
whose components operate in tandem to keep occupants safe.41
Accordingly, a plaintiff who fails to buckle their seatbelt uses the
vehicle’s safety system and should be subject to the traditional products
liability defense of misuse.42
II. BANS ON THE DEFENSE: THE PRICE FOR SEATBELT MANDATES
Unsurprisingly, then, as automobiles began including safety devices
like seatbelts, courts recognized the applicability of the seatbelt
defense.43 Despite the seatbelt defense’s deep roots in tort law
fundamentals, most states have enacted some statutory limitation or
outright prohibition of the seatbelt defense.44 Most of these prohibitions
were enacted with and are codified within statutes mandating seatbelt

38. See Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative:
Which is the Optimal Negligence Rule, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 46–47 (2003) (outlining
“[t]he three principal rationales for tort law” as “deterrence, compensation and corrective
justice.”).
39. Id.
40. The seatbelt defense also applies where tort law and contract law overlap. Where
plaintiffs sue automakers on breach of warranty principles, failure to wear an available
seatbelt is relevant to a plaintiff’s duty to mitigate damages. James Joseph Gettel,
Comparative Fault as a Defense to Breach of Warranty under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 14 N.C. CENT. L.J. 628 (1984).
41. See Cochran, supra note 11, at 1380.
42. Gardner by and through Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 737 (10th Cir.
1996) (affirming trial court order admitting evidence of plaintiff’s nonuse of seat belt to
disprove design defect allegations because “Chrysler designed an occupant restraint
system that included the seat belt . . . .”).
43. See Jesse N. Bomer, The Seatbelt Defense: A Doctrine Based in Common Sense, 38
TULSA L. REV. 405, 407–12 (2002).
44. Id. at 416–17.
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use and imposing penalties for failure to comply.45 This legislative
pairing was no coincidence; legislators (and the stakeholders who lobby
them) demanded these liability shields and carveouts as the price for
supporting legislation that—like the pandemic-related measures
currently whipping Americans into a personal freedom frenzy—
purports to tell individuals how to take care of themselves.46
A. Origins of Statutory Seatbelt Defense Limits
Prior to the introduction of mandatory seatbelt laws, some states
already limited the seatbelt defense under the principle that there is no
affirmative duty to buckle up.47 However, statutory limits on the
defense proliferated with—and as a response to—state laws mandating
seatbelt use.48 Debates around seatbelt mandates “centered on two
issues,” with advocates of the mandate arguing “for the benefits in
terms of injuries prevented or minimized and money saved[,]” while
opponents “were concerned with whether the Act infringed on personal
freedom to choose . . . .”49 To balance those competing interests, many
states included in their seatbelt mandates express limitations on
evidence of seatbelt nonuse in civil actions.50
B. Scattershot Approaches to the Defense
Some states broadly prohibit the use of evidence of seatbelt nonuse
for almost any conceivable purpose, while others have attempted to
narrow their prohibitions to allow for limited use of the seatbelt defense
in certain scenarios.51 Of the states that limit or ban the seatbelt
defense, the majority outright prohibits the use of evidence of seatbelt
nonuse to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery in any type of tort case.52 Some
45. Cochran, supra note 11, at 1399–1400.
46. See Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, 903 P.2d 423, 427–28 (Utah 1995) (assuming
that seatbelt mandate that bans seatbelt defense in civil actions reflects legislature’s
legitimate interest in “public policy which encourages seat belt use yet at the same time
weigh[s] the positive benefits of such a policy against the severity of the penalties for
noncompliance.”).
47. Cochran, supra note 11, at 1400; Mangrum, supra note 29, at 968 (noting a
majority of courts who faced the seatbelt defense had rejected it).
48. Mangrum, supra note 29, at 974.
49. Ryan, 903 P.2d at 427.
50. C.W. Matthews Contracting Co., Inc. v. Glover, 263 Ga. 108, 109, 428 S.E.2d 796,
798 (1993) (“legislature set the state’s public policy [in mandating seatbelt use] but
weighed the positive benefits of the policy against the severity of the penalty for noncompliance.”).
51. Cochran, supra note 11, at 1400.
52. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1 (2021).
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states have recognized some of the unjust and illogical effects of
prohibiting the defense,53 and amended their codes to permit the use of
the defense under limited, specific circumstances.54 Noble though those
efforts have been, remedying the problems with banning the seatbelt
defense requires an axe, rather than a scalpel.55
Georgia’s prohibition on the seatbelt defense exemplifies the majority
approach.56 Georgia’s statute covers the range of conceivable
applications for the seatbelt defense, from liability determination to
damages calculation. After declaring that “[e]ach occupant of the front
seat of a passenger vehicle shall, while such passenger vehicle is being
operated on a public road, street, or highway of this state, be restrained
by a seat safety belt,” Georgia’s seatbelt law provides:
The failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a safety belt in
any seat of a motor vehicle which has a safety belt or belts shall not
be considered evidence of negligence or causation, shall not otherwise
be considered by the finder of fact on any question of liability of any
person, corporation, or insurer, shall not be any basis for cancellation
of coverage or increase in insurance rates, and shall not be evidence
used to diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, occupancy, or operation of a motor
vehicle.57

In Georgia, therefore, evidence of seatbelt nonuse is absolutely
barred from use to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery.58 Georgia’s statute also
bars evidence of seatbelt nonuse from consideration “by the finder
[trier] of fact on any question of liability of any person, corporation, or
insurer,”59 which ensures that evidence of a plaintiff’s failure to buckle
up may not be used as a defense to product liability claims.60 Georgia’s
legislature plainly sought to sweeten the medicine of legislation that
threatens the American religion of individualism by severely restricting
the State’s ability to compel personal behavior change.

53. See infra Section III.
54. Arkansas and Tennessee recognized the effects of prohibiting the defense. See
Bomer, supra note 43, at 422 n. 165.
55. See infra Section V.
56. Bomer, supra note 43, at 416–17.
57. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(d) (2021).
58. Id.; see C.W. Matthews, 263 Ga. at 110, 428 S.E.2d at 799 (noting the legislature’s
“broad statement of purpose read in conjunction with the language of O.C.G.A.
§ 40-8-76.1(d)” required broad, across-the-board exclusion of seatbelt nonuse evidence in
civil actions).
59. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(d).
60. Denton v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1221–22 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
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South Carolina offers another example of a broad ban on the seatbelt
defense baked into a seatbelt law.61 South Carolina directly prohibits
courts from applying to unrestrained plaintiffs the fundamentals of tort
law that undergird every other type of tort action, baldly stating that
failure to buckle up “is not negligence per se or contributory negligence
and is not admissible as evidence in a civil action.”62
Arkansas and Tennessee demonstrate the minority approach, which
attempts to thread the needle of permitting the seatbelt defense in
limited cases while erecting procedural barriers to limit the application
further.63 When it first mandated seatbelt use, Arkansas also broadly
limited the use of a plaintiff’s seatbelt nonuse in civil actions.64 In 2016,
however, Arkansas’s legislature amended the statute to allow
defendants in products liability cases to use the defense, but only if they
followed a set of strict procedural steps, including raising the defense at
the earliest opportunity.65 Arkansas’s statute provided that:
Evidence of the failure [to wear a seatbelt] may be admitted in a civil
action as to the causal relationship between noncompliance [with the
seatbelt mandate] and the injuries alleged, if the following conditions
have been satisfied:
(A)The plaintiff has filed a products liability claim other than a claim
related to an alleged failure of a seat belt;
(B)The defendant alleging noncompliance . . . shall raise the defense
in its answer or timely amendment thereto in accordance with the
rules of civil procedure; and
(C)Each defendant seeking to offer evidence alleging noncompliance
has the burden of proving:
(i)Noncompliance;
(ii) That compliance would have reduced injuries; and
(iii)The extent of the reduction of the injuries.66

61. S.C. CODE. ANN. § 56-5-6540(C) (2021).
62. Id.
63. See Bomer, supra note 43, at 420–22.
64. Spencer G. Dougherty, Unbuckling the Seat Belt Defense in Arkansas, 73 ARK. L.
REV. 135, 136–37 (2020).
65. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 27-37-703 (2021) (ruled unconstitutional by Mendoza v. WIS
Int’l, Inc., 490 S.W.3d 298, 304 (Ark. 2016)).
66. Id.
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Tennessee’s approach mirrors its neighbor. While Tennessee
previously barred evidence of nonuse to reduce recoveries in all civil
cases,67 it now permits the use of the seatbelt defense, but only in
products liability cases and only where the defendant raises the defense
in its answer or timely amendment.68 Other states endeavor to strike
the public safety/personal choice balance through different approaches,
including permitting the defense in determinations of damages but
barring it for liability, or capping the percentage of fault attributable to
a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seatbelt.69
Because each of these approaches relies on the legal fiction that
general tort principles are inapplicable to a vehicle occupant’s failure to
buckle up, limitations on and prohibitions of the defense cause
breakdowns in justice that cannot be solved through ad hoc carveouts
and exemptions.
III. IN PRACTICE: STRANGER THAN LEGAL FICTION
Barring the seatbelt defense collides with basic legal principles in
ways that cannot be sufficiently resolved on a case-by-case basis. This
Section offers a look at three reasons why prohibiting or limiting the
seatbelt defense produces absurd and unjust results.
A. Crashworthiness and Integrated Safety Systems
Under the crashworthiness doctrine, which has been adopted in all
fifty states, an auto manufacturer can be held liable for negligence,
breach of warranty, or strict liability where a design defect enhanced a
plaintiff’s injury beyond what the plaintiff would have suffered as a
result of a collision.70 This doctrine permits an injured plaintiff to
recover against an automaker where a defect in the vehicle’s design
caused or exacerbated the plaintiff’s injury—even where the defect does
not cause the initial collision or impact.71 The doctrine imposes on
manufacturers “a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle

67. Bomer, supra note 43, at 421–22.
68. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 55-9-604 (2021).
69. For example, Iowa, Michigan, and Oregon cap the reduction of a plaintiff’s
recovery at 5%, and Wisconsin at 15%. IOWA CODE § 321.445(4) (1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 257.710e(6) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.760 (2021); Cochran, supra note 11, at 1419
n.200.
70. Blankenship, 406 S.E.2d at 782–83; 63A AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability § 931
(2021).
71. Products Liability, supra note 70.
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to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the
event of a collision.”72
In crashworthiness cases, the inquiry is focused on “the product
design as an integrated whole,” and “consider[s] all the factors which
contribute to the event which causes the injury.”73 “The design of
individual components within [a] car need not be considered in a
vacuum because safety features such as seatbelts are a part of the
overall design.”74 Therefore, evidence that a crashworthiness plaintiff
failed to use one of the key parts of that overall design is “relevant to
the issue of whether the overall design is defective and unreasonably
dangerous.”75 In effect, “[t]he seatbelt defense is to plaintiffs what the
crashworthiness rule is to defendants,” because each theory guarantees
that “the parties are held responsible if their negligence causes
exacerbation of damages.”76 Although some states have followed
Arkansas’ approach by permitting seatbelt nonuse in crashworthiness
cases, states like Georgia deny crashworthiness juries the information
necessary to assess a vehicle’s safety design fairly.77
B. Comparative Negligence and Apportioned Fault
Another problem arises where states that prohibit the seatbelt
defense also employ comparative negligence or other apportionment
schemes that require factfinders to calculate damages then reduce the
awards by the plaintiff’s proportion of fault.78 Beginning in the middle
of the Nineteenth century and accelerating during the 1960s and 1970s,
comparative negligence or apportioned fault schemes have gradually
replaced pure contributory negligence in the overwhelming majority of

72. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
73. Estate of Hunter v. GMC, 729 So.2d 1264, 1271 (Miss. 1999) (quoting HILDY
BOWBEER & BARD D. BORKON, LITIGATING THE COMPLEX MOTOR VEHICLE CASE 1992, 9, 37
(1992)).
74. LaHue v. General Motors Corp., 716 F. Supp. 407, 417, 418 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
(noting that “case law supports defendant’s position that an automobile is a product which
may be considered as a whole,” and therefore holding “[t]he defendant in this case should
be permitted to introduce evidence concerning whether seat belts were available and
operable.”).
75. Id. at 418.
76. Cochran, supra note 11, at 1397.
77. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4513.263(F)(1)–(2) (2021); see also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 55-9-604(a).
78. See Mangrum, supra note 29, at 976 (“[t]he most persuasive arguments in favor of
the seat belt defense can be made in pure comparative fault jurisdictions.”).
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U.S. jurisdictions.79 States adopted comparative negligence to remedy
the stark injustice of denying any recovery to a plaintiff who bore even
1% of the fault.80 In these states, a negligent plaintiff may still recover,
but their recovery must be reduced by the percentage of the fault a
factfinder attributes to the plaintiff in causing their own damages.81
Where these states prohibit those same factfinders from considering the
plaintiff’s failure to wear a seatbelt, defendants are punished beyond
their culpability, and plaintiffs walk away with inflated awards.82
For example, both Georgia and South Carolina, which employ broad
prohibitions on the seatbelt defense, rely on comparative fault schemes
that require factfinders to calculate the plaintiff’s share of
responsibility.83 Ironically, Georgia was the first state to adopt
comparative negligence to moderate the extreme results of pure
contributory negligence schemes.84 Georgia’s apportionment scheme
applies to plaintiffs who are “to some degree responsible for the injury
or damages claimed,” and requires “the trier of fact, in its
determination of the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any [to]
determine the percentage of fault of the plaintiff[.]”85 Only after the
award is reduced by the percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff
may the factfinder apportion the remaining fault among defendants—
and, under certain conditions, nonparties.86 Importantly, “the plaintiff
shall not be entitled to receive any damages if the plaintiff is 50 percent
or more responsible for the injury or damages claimed.”87 South
Carolina’s apportionment system similarly bars a plaintiff from
recovering where their own negligence exceeds that of the combined
negligence of the defendants.88
79. See Jennifer J. Karangelen, The Road to Judicial Abolishment of Contributory
Negligence, 2 BALTIMORE L. R. 265, 269 (2004).
80. Id.; see also Robinette, supra note 38, at 41.
81. Robinette, supra note 38, at 42.
82. Peter Scaff, The Final Piece of the Seat Belt Evidence Puzzle, 36 HOU. LAW REV.
1371, 1408 (1999) (“comparative causation provides a more equitable means for allocating
the risk of loss for defendants . . . .” and “introduction of seat belt evidence under a
comparative causation scheme is an effective and efficient means of properly allocating
responsibility . . . .”).
83. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15 (2021).
84. Robinette, supra note 38, at 42.
85. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a) (2021).
86. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) (2021).
87. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(g) (2021).
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15; see Humphrey v. Day & Zimmerman Int’l, Inc., 997
F.Supp.2d 388, 397 (D.S.C. 2014) (“[i]n South Carolina, a plaintiff may only recover
damages if his own negligence is not greater than that of the defendant”) (citing Hurd v.
Williamsburg Cty., 611 S.E.2d 488, 492 (S.C. 2005)).
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Paradoxically, in both states, defendants are prohibited from
introducing evidence that a plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care
by buckling up.89 In collision cases involving unrestrained plaintiffs,
factfinders must stubbornly ignore the very facts that are critical to fair
apportionment of fault. As a result, unrestrained plaintiffs get away
with recovering more than they are due.
C. Constitutional Problems
Finally, blocking the seatbelt defense raises constitutional concerns,
particularly where states permit the defense in limited scenarios.90 For
example, in 2016, the Supreme Court of Arkansas struck down the
statutory provision granting limited permission to use the defense in
products cases.91 On a certified question from a federal district court,
the court held that the legislature exceeded its authority in enacting
Arkansas Code Annotated § 27-37-703, “which restrict[ed] the
admissibility of seat belt-nonuse evidence in civil actions . . . .”92
In the underlying action, a backseat plaintiff suffered severe injuries
when the vehicle driver fell asleep and crashed the car.93 Because the
driver was acting within the scope of his employment at the time, the
plaintiff sued both the driver and his employer.94 The defendants
sought to introduce the plaintiff’s seatbelt nonuse as evidence of
comparative negligence, but Arkansas law barred the evidence.95 The
district court certified the question of whether the limitation on seatbelt
nonuse evidence violated Arkansas’ separation of powers principles to
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which accepted the question.96
The defendants argued the limitation on the seatbelt defense
amounted to a procedural rule governing the admissibility of evidence,
which Arkansas’ constitution reserves to the judicial branch.97 In
defense of the limitation, the plaintiff framed the statute as affecting
substantive tort law, which the legislature is fully empowered to do.98
89. See supra Section II.
90. See, e.g., Mendoza, 490 S.W.3d at 298; but see McKinney v. Jarvis, No. M199900565-COA-R9-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 165, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2000)
(holding prohibition of seatbelt nonuse is a “question that falls into the legislative realm[]”
and therefore comports with separation of powers).
91. Mendoza, 490 S.W.3d at 304.
92. Id. at 299.
93. Id. at 300.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 299; see Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc., 2015 Ark. 321 (2015).
97. Mendoza, 490 S.W.3d at 301.
98. Id.
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The court noted that Arkansas amended its broad prohibition on the
defense, which provided that evidence of seatbelt nonuse “shall not be
considered under any circumstances as evidence of comparative or
contributory negligence,” to permit the seatbelt defense in products
liability cases.99 In amending the statute, the legislature dropped the
qualifying “comparative or contributory negligence” language.100
Because the revised statute therefore broadly declared that “failure of
an occupant to wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt shall not
be admissible into evidence in a civil action,” the court held the
amendment had transformed the substantive law into a rule of
evidence.101 Therefore, the statute violated separation of powers and the
Arkansas Constitution.102
Earlier constitutional challenges centered on whether limitations on
the seatbelt defense violated due process or equal protection. Courts
faced with these questions concluded that legislatures had a legitimate
interest in limiting the civil penalties for violating seatbelt mandates.
Some courts offered so much deference to legislatures that they would
skate over the constitutional analysis.
For example, the Georgia Supreme Court in C.W. Matthews
Contracting v. Gover dismissed a constitutional challenge to O.C.G.A.
§ 40-8-76.1. 103 The court reasoned that—just as the state had a
legitimate interest in encouraging the use of seatbelts—the state also
had a legitimate interest in “imposing limitations upon the means of
such encouragement[.]”104 Similarly, the court held that the statute
“treats all similarly situated persons equally, as it prohibits anyone
from offering, as evidence of negligence, the fact that a party failed to
wear a seat belt.”105 Accordingly, Georgia’s ban on seatbelt nonuse
evidence satisfied both equal protection and due process.
In 2000, Tennessee’s intermediate appellate court fielded a due
process challenge to its statutory limitation on seatbelt evidence.106 The
Tennessee Court of Appeals echoed the reasoning from C.W. Matthews,
concluding that Tennessee’s rejection of the seat belt defense was
rationally related to the state’s interest in “enact[ing] a system of

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 302.
Id.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 303–04.
263 Ga. at 110, 428 S.E.2d at 799.
Id. at 109, 428 S.E.2d at 798.
Id. at 110, 428 S.E.2d at 799.
McKinney, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *1.
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rewards and punishments for compliance/noncompliance” with the
seatbelt mandate.107
The Utah Supreme Court more closely analyzed the interestbalancing at play.108 It, unlike the courts in Tennessee and Georgia,
acknowledged baldly that the “statutory scheme . . . creates a class of
tort defendants who are treated differently from other tort defendants,”
and therefore centered its analysis on “whether this disparate
treatment is justified.”109 Again, unlike the courts in C.W. Matthews
and McKinney, the court acknowledged that the seat belt statute “does
not, in and of itself, promote safety,” but serves the legislature’s
purpose of resolving the “conflicting interests” of public safety and
personal choice.110 Striking that balance, the court held, served a
legitimate state interest separate and apart from the policy of
encouraging seatbelt use.111
Next, the court examined “whether there is a reasonable
relationship” between the limitation on the seatbelt defense and the
state’s interest in striking the safety or freedom balance.112 Because
“[m]andating that nonuse of a seat belt does not constitute contributory
or comparative negligence is a reasonable means of ensuring that a
legislated public policy encouraging seat belt use adequately weighs the
impingement on personal freedom,” Utah’s prohibition on seatbelt
nonuse evidence was therefore constitutional.113 Changes in law and
society since these challenges potentially alter this interest-balancing
calculation because the facts underlying state justifications of banning
the defense have shifted the equation.
IV. CHANGING REALITIES: DIMINISHING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR BANNING
THE DEFENSE
When states started mandating seatbelt use, political pressure
mounted to build safeguards into the statutes to limit the government’s
infringement on individual choice.114 Legislators also ensured that the
new public safety measures did not create a new defense in car wreck
cases.115 Plaintiffs’ lawyers worried seatbelt mandates would create a
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at *6.
Ryan, 903 P.2d at 423.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 427.
Id.
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new basis for defendants to claim contributory negligence—and
therefore to use evidence of seatbelt nonuse as the basis for finding
unrestrained plaintiffs negligent per se.116
At the time, pure contributory negligence schemes were more
common than comparative fault schemes, so if plaintiffs were found to
be contributorily negligent for failure to wear a seatbelt, they were
totally barred from recovering any damages.117 That unforgiving
standard, therefore, justified concerns that seatbelt mandates would tip
the balance in collision cases heavily in favor of defendants.
However, all but four states have now abolished pure contributory
negligence.118 American tort law now relies on the notion that negligent
plaintiffs should still be permitted to recover the extent of their
damages that the defendants’ negligence caused.119 Since pure
contributory negligence relies on the idea that only the perfect plaintiff
deserves compensation, pretending seatbelt nonuse was not negligent
conduct made a bit more sense. Now that our application of negligence
law has become more rooted in reality—and correspondingly fairer,
fears of seatbelt nonuse as a basis for apportioning fault to a plaintiff no
longer adequately justify banning the seatbelt defense.
Moreover, the decades of behavioral and technological changes since
the widespread adoption of seatbelt mandates have shifted the values
in the negligence calculation. First, the burden of wearing a seatbelt
has continued to diminish.120 Seatbelt use has increased over the
decades. In 2020, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) recorded a seatbelt use rate in the U.S. at 90.3%, compared to
70.7% in 2000 and 58% in 1994.121 The near ubiquity of seatbelt use
both reduces the urgency of state interest in encouraging widespread
buckling and strengthens the argument that refusing to buckle up
carries some culpability that tort law should recognize. An argument
that the burden of belting justifies the increased risk to unrestrained
occupants simply carries less and less weight as more and more
Americans buckle their seatbelts as a matter of habit.
116. Id.
117. See Mangrum, supra note 29, at 975–76.
118. Robinette, supra note 38, at 44–45.
119. Id. at 43.
120. As early as 1985, a myriad of commentary argued that the burden of seat belt use
was outweighed by the safety benefits of buckling up. Mangrum, supra note 29, at 979–
80.
121. Trends
in
Occupant
Restraint
Use
and
Fatalities,
NHTSA,
https://one.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/buckleup/ii__trends.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2021); National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Seat Belt Use in 2020–Overall
Results (Feb. 2021), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813072.
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Changes over time also affected the factors on the other side of the
negligence formula. Today’s seatbelts are much more effective at
preventing serious injury or death, making a plaintiff’s failure to wear
one that much more negligent. Moreover, modern vehicles employ
integrated safety systems comprised of multiple components that work
in tandem to protect occupants.122 Therefore, failure to wear a seatbelt
can compromise the effectiveness of other safety features built into the
vehicle’s design, increasing the potential for and severity of collisionrelated injuries.123
The progression of American tort law toward fair allocation of fault
combined with behavioral and technological changes nullify the old
justifications for limiting or banning the seatbelt defense. Accordingly,
a full revival of the defense is a necessary step in the development of
tort law.
V. IT’S TIME: REINSTATE THE DEFENSE
Not only are the original justifications for banning the defense no
longer persuasive, but the benefits of repealing the bans are also
literally immeasurable. The nature of confidential settlements and
exclusion of evidence makes quantification impossible, but one can
imagine the savings potential in insurance payouts if collision cases
involving unrestrained plaintiffs were valued appropriately instead of
benefiting from artificial inflation. Presumably, those savings could be
passed onto insured drivers through reduced premiums.
Additionally, fairly apportioning fault between plaintiffs and
defendants will better serve the compensatory and deterrent functions
of tort law. Unrestrained plaintiffs will no longer be rewarded for their
own negligence, and defendants will no longer be unduly punished
because they collided with (or designed a vehicle occupied by) a
negligent plaintiff.
Modern efforts to revive the defense have largely proven
unsuccessful. Perhaps recognizing the diminishing weight of the
original arguments against the defense, most advocates for continuing
to limit or ban evidence of seatbelt nonuse now argue that permitting
the defense will turn every collision case into a battle of the experts on
the issue of causation.
This new argument also falls short. First, expert testimony already
dominates crashworthiness litigation, and allowing those experts to
consider evidence of seatbelt nonuse will simply enhance the credibility

122. See supra Section III.
123. Id.
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and probative value of their testimony. Moreover, expert testimony is
unnecessary in most collision cases. In most scenarios, lay jurors can
understand the risks of seatbelt nonuse and can determine whether and
to what extent failure to buckle up causes a plaintiff’s injuries. Finally,
near-ubiquitous seatbelt use will continue to shrink the number of cases
in which plaintiffs are unrestrained, limiting the number of cases
necessitating expert opinions on seatbelt causation. While reviving the
seatbelt defense may increase the need for expert testimony in some
cases, the benefits of lifting limits on the defense outweigh the potential
for complications of simple collision cases.
As today’s raging public health debate continues to boil over, lessons
from the past can instruct the future. During public safety emergencies,
when encouraging widespread behavioral change remains urgent, the
short-term effects of baking exemptions and liability shields into
legislative mandates seem insignificant. However, as the history of the
seatbelt defense illustrates, once the policy objectives of the mandates
have been realized, the costs of exemptions and immunities become
clear. Reviving the seatbelt defense now will move American tort law
further in its march toward fair allocation of fault and remedy the
unjust results of this anachronistic policy.

